Palliative care
The most controversial legal issue with respect to palliative care in the countries under consideration has been the use of opioids to alleviate patients' suffering in their final stages of life, particularly when the opioids are suspected of causing death. In the 1957 English case of R. v. Adams,1 0 Dr. John
Bodkin Adams was charged with murder when it was discovered that he had treated a number of elderly patients who had died in his care with high doses of narcotic analgesics. In his address to the jury, Lord Justice Devlin said that a physician "is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, even if the measures he takes may incidentally shorten life."" This approach is sometimes called the doctrine of double effect. Under this doctrine, the cause of death of patients who die while receiving pain treatment will be attributed to the underlying disease in situations where the patient's pain and other discomforts are controlled through properly calibrated titration of dosages, even if the dosages are high.12 This is because the law sees a sharp distinction between appropriate palliative care, offered with an intention to ease a patient's pain and suffering, and actions specifically aimed at ending a patient's life." 3 This approach has been adopted by the House of Lords,1 4 the Supreme Court of Canada,'" and the Supreme Court of the United States.' 6 The High Court of Australia has yet to determine this issue. However, the South Australian Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act of 199517 provides that medical practitioners will not incur civil or criminal liability for administering medical treatment with the intention of relieving the pain or distress of patients in the terminal phase of a terminal illness, even though an incidental effect of the treatment would be to hasten the death of the patient, providing they do so "with the consent of the patient or the patient's representative; and in good faith and without negligence; and in accordance with proper professional standards of palliative care." If these requirements are met, then "for the purposes of the law of the State, the administration of medical treatment for the relief of pain or distress ... does not constitute an intervening cause of death.""l Withdrawal and withholding of medical treatment from incompetent or unconscious patients where there is no advance directive In England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, but not in Scotland,'" the discontinuance of artificial nutrition and hydration for a patient in a vegetative state requires the prior sanction of a High Court 20 by way of a declaration based on the best interests test. 2 1 The seminal common law case on the withdrawal of artificial life supports from incompetent persons is Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland.2 Anthony Bland, at the age of 17, sustained catastrophic and irreversible damage to the higher centers of his brain, which left him in a persistent vegetative state. The House of Lords decided that doctors might lawfully discontinue biochemical and other life support systems from a patient in a persistent vegetative state where the cessation of nourishment and hydration is an omission, and not an act.
The House of Lords reasoned that nonconsensual treatment violates the principle of personal autonomy. Incompetent patients may, however, be treated nonvoluntarily on the basis of the doctrine of necessity where their best interests require that the treatment be administered "for the protection of the plaintiff's health and possibly his [sapient] life."21 Once it becomes clear that the patient is permanently comatose or in a persistent vegetative state, however, his or her interests in being kept alive have ceased, taking with them the justification for the nonconsensual medical treatment, even though termination of life supports will also not further the person's best interests. In such circumstances, according to the House of Lords, there is no longer a duty to provide nourishment and hydration, and therefore failure to do so cannot constitute a criminal offense. Thus, Lord Goff of Chieveley observed:
For my part, I cannot see that medical treatment is appropriate or requisite simply to prolong a patient's life when such treatment has no therapeutic purpose of any kind, as where it is futile because the patient is unconscious and there is no prospect of any improvement in his condition. In Australia, doctors must apply the best interests standard when treating incompetent patients who have not executed a binding advance directive. The legal situation regarding withdrawal and withholding of life-saving or lifesustaining treatment is, however, unclear. In Marion's Case,27 the High Court of Australia determined that where persons are disabled by age or mental incapacity from giving valid consent, an order or direction must be sought from the Family Court or Guardianship Board for authorization of nontherapeutic procedures. Since discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment is nontherapeutic, it might be prudent for doctors to seek similar directions.u
The South Australian Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act is an exception to this general rule insofar as it provides that, in cases where there is no valid prior direction to the contrary, a medical practitioner responsible for the treatment or care of a patient in the terminal phase of a terminal illness is "under no duty to use, or to continue to use, life sustaining measures in treating the patient if the effect of doing so would be merely to prolong life in a moribund state without any real prospect of recovery or in a persistent vegetative state."2" In such cases, "the nonapplication or discontinuance of life sustaining measures... does not constitute an intervening cause of death (i.e. novus actus interveniens: a cause that breaks a pre-existing chain of causation)."
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In Canada, a similar regime prevails. The Manitoba Court of Appeal has ruled that physicians have a unilateral right to make nontreatment decisions. 3 " Assisted suicide and active euthanasia The common law distinguishes between a physician's conduct in letting a patient die from an underlying disease and conduct that makes the patient die. It is the intention to bring about the death of another that forms the basis of the crimes of assisted suicide and murder.
In Canada, the question of whether the right to refuse life-saving treatment should encompass the right to assisted suicide was determined in 1993 in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 32 a case involving a 42-year-old woman who suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Mrs. Rodriguez argued that the right to refuse medical treatment was a "liberty and security of the person" interest, protected by S 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights. She contended that she had a constitutional right to have a qualified physitian set up technological means by which she might end her life when she was no longer able to enjoy life, by her own hand, and at the time of her choosing. She applied for an order that S241 (b) of the Criminal Code," 3 which prohibits the giving of assistance to commit suicide, be declared invalid on the ground that by precluding a terminally ill person from committing "physician-assisted" suicide, it violated her rights under S 7.
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada determined that the Canadian Charter does not require lifting the statutory ban against assisted suicide because S 7 of the Charter protects three fundamental values: (1) the notion of personal autonomy relating to the right to make choices concerning one's own body; (2) freedom from state interference with respect to control over one's physical and psychological integrity and basic human dignity; and (3) the sanctity of life. The court noted: "even when death appears imminent, seeking to control the manner and timing of one's death constitutes a conscious choice of death over life." 34 Even though the prohibition of assisted suicide in S 241(b) of the Criminal Code impinged upon the first two values, these were trumped by the third value -protecting and maintaining respect for human life. In 1995, the Canadian Senate Special Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide recommended that the prohibition against assisted suicide remain intact. 3 3 6 Dianne Pretty had a motor neurone disease, a progressive neuro-degenerative disease of motor cells within the central nervous system. She was paralyzed from the neck downwards and confined to a wheelchair. 37 She requested the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) of the United Kingdom to agree in advance not to prosecute her husband were he to help her to commit suicide. Under S 2(1) of the Suicide Act of 1961 (U.K.), 3 " it is a criminal offense with a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment for a person to aid, abet, counsel, or procure the suicide of another.
The House of Lords determined, and the European Court of Human Rights affirmed (unanimously dismissing Mrs. Pretty's appeal), that there is no right to assisted suicide under common law or statute, and that no such right is guaranteed by the ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights declared that Article 2, which safeguards the right to life, cannot be interpreted as "conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die; nor can it create a right to self-determination in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose death rather than life." 3 9 The court noted that although the conditions of terminally ill individuals vary, many patients will be vulnerable, and it is the vulnerability of the class that provides the rationale for the law against assisted suicide. 4 ' Robert Latimer, a Saskatchewan farmer, asphyxiated his 12-year-old daughter, Tracy, who had a severe form of cerebral palsy, by venting exhaust fumes from his pickup truck's tail pipe into the cab where he had placed Tracy. He was convicted of second-degree murder 4 and received the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 10 years. 4 The qualifying clause "unless prompt medical intervention is necessary" refers to the "duty to rescue" provision contained in Article 30 of the Medical Profession Act.6' Article 30 imposes upon medical practitioners a duty to always save human life when a delay would result in death or serious physical or mental injury, or in other cases of emergency. (1) In terminal states the physician does not have the duty to undertake and continue resuscitation or persistent treatment, nor to resort to extraordinary measures, and ( 2) The decision to discontinue resuscitation rests with the physician and should be based on the assessment of the likely therapeutic success.
Yet, unless the conflict between the substantive civil and criminal law and the Code of Medical Ethics can be resolved, substantive law -that is, the duty to rescue -will prevail over deontological and ethical principles. 73 the French Parliament enacted the law of June 9, 1999 directed at guaranteeing access to palliative care for anyone "whose state of ill health requires it."' 4 The law of June 9, 1999 reinforces Article 3 8 of the 1995 Code of Medical Deontology, which, unlike the Polish Code of Medical Ethics, has statutory force, and is thus legally binding.7 5 The Code of Medical Deontology mandates that: a dying person must be attended until the last, and given appropriate care and suitable support to preserve the quality of the life which is ending. A patient's dignity should be protected, and his or her entourage comforted.7 6 Though the emphasis is on alleviation of "sufferings" (les souffrances), and on the preservation of the dying person's quality of life, the law provides statutory encouragement for doctors to treat their patients with adequate doses of analgesic medication. The care provided must be "conscientious and accord with the scientific data."7"
Article 37 of the Code of Medical Deontology cautions medical practitioners to "avoidany unreasonable obstinacy in pursuing investigations and treatments." In the context of the provision, the reference is presumably to avoid "aggressive" or "futile" treatment, which may or may not encompass withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment.'7
Competent patients in France have a statutory right to refuse proposed treatment." The law also grants relatives the right to be warned and informed, but gives them no power to make binding treatment decisions on behalf of an incompetent patient.1 0 France has neither statutory rules nor medicoethical guidelines 8 " governing the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients. Indeed, the legal position relating to withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is complex. One of the problems stems from the definition of fault in French law. At common law, the question of whether an omission amounts to a legal fault depends on the scope of the duty. In cases of withholding or discontinuance of treatment, the question is whether the physician is under a duty to undertake or continue life-sustaining treatment for the particular patient. In France, for purposes of legal responsibility, the concept of fault by omission in the sense of abstention within an action (faute d'abstention dans l'action)' 2 is governed by a general principle rather than case-specific considerations: Once the treatment has been undertaken, withdrawal of treatment that leads to the deterioration of the patient's condition and consequent death will amount to a legal fault. Under the French doctrine of "unity of criminal and civil faults," physicians who withdraw or terminate treatment may be liable under civil as well as criminal law.
Just as in Poland, the well-entrenched positive duty to rescue a person in danger embodied in Article 223-6(2) of the new 1992 Criminal Code (Article 63 ofrthe old Criminal Code) makes a failure to rescue an offense (d6llit).1 3 The medical duty to assist is expressed in a mandatory form in Article 9 of the Code of Medical Deontology.1 4 The crime of failure to rescue belongs in the category of "endangering behavior" offenses (mise en danger d6liberge
5 the category also includes the offense of deliberately exposing a person to danger of death or injury (Article 223-1 of the new Criminal Code). Decisions to discontinue vasopressive drugs, undertake terminal weaning from ventilation, or withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation and mechanical ventilation from a patient would fall within these categories of offense. In 1996, an anesthesiologist who decided to extubate and withhold resuscitation from a patient who had no chance of recovery or survival was convicted of involuntary homicide by the Court of Appeal of Rouen on the grounds that the doctor's conduct was "against all logic, medical ethics and accepted rules of good practice."1 6 The Court of Cassation (Courde Cassation) dismissed the physician's appeal." French jurists haVe interpreted the decision in the context of the debate about legalizing the practice of euthanasia and assisted suicide." The Court of Cassation's reasoning is in harmony with the second clause of Article 38 of the Code of Medical Deontology, which mandates that a physician "has no right to deliberately bring about death."
Inciting (provoquer) another to commit suicide is a crime under Article 223-13 of the Criminal Code, punishable by three years imprisonment. Providing drugs, lethal substances, or mechanical devices designed to enable a patient to commit suicide would come within the ambit of this offense. Encouragement and advertising of methods to commit suicide are offenses against the person under Article 223-14 of the Criminal Code. However, with the advent of the World Wide Web, this law may be difficult to police., 9 With regard to active euthanasia, Article 221-1 of the Criminal Code states: "voluntarily killing another constitutes murder," and is punishable by 30 years imprisonment. The offense of homicide has to be a positive intentional act rather than an abstention that causes death.1 0 Killing another person on request would fulfill the requirement. The French Criminal Code includes a specific offense of poisoning, defined as "attacking the life of another through the use or administration of substances that cause death," which is also punishable by 30 years imprisonment. 9 1 In the prosecution of employees from the French National Blood Transfusion Centre (Centre National de Transfusion Sanguine) for knowingly placing on the market unheated blood products infected with HIV, the Court of Cassation did not exclude the possibility that the offense of poisoning could be made out without the specific intention to kill.9 2 In 1999, a criminal penalty was imposed on a hospital physician for "accompanying into death" a 92-year-old comatose and hemiplegic woman who developed gangrene. The physician injected the patient with 5 grams of potassium chloride.9 3 The National Council of theýOrder of Physicians suspended the defendant for one year from medical practice for violation of the second clause of Article 38 of the Code of Medical Deontology." GERMANY Article 2, ¶ 2 of the German Constitution recognizes that "everyone has a right to life and to bodily integrity." In the context of other medicolegal controversies, such as those involving abortion or research involving human embryos, Germany has taken a strong "pro-life" position. Indeed, Germany's historical burden from the Nazi period is often invoked as imposing upon Germany the obligation to provide leadership to the world in fighting to recognize and preserve the sanctity of life.s
The German Constitution also, however, recognizes rights to "free development of personality,"' "inviolable freedom,"97 and "inviolable dignity."' 8 In fact, as the law of decisionmaking at the end of life has developed in Germany, the right to free and autonomous decision-making has uniformly trumped the right to life. German law governing end-of-life decisions is at this point driven primarily, indeed almost solely, by the principle of autonomous decision-making.
Since at least the 1950s, the German courts have recognized the right of patients to refuse medical treatment.99 It is beyond dispute that a competent dying patient in Germany can refuse treatment intended to extend his or her life. If an informed patient refuses life-sustaining treatment, the treatment must be terminated. This is referred to in Germany as "passive Sterbehilfe," and is generally accepted.
The right to self-determination for the competent patient extends beyond this, however. Suicide is not illegal in Germany.°0 While the law does prohibit active euthanasia,' 0 ' in a 2001 case, the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshot) held that the psychologist-leader of an assisted suicide group who aided an elderly woman suffering from multiple sclerosis and other infirmities to commit suicide by supplying a deadly drug was not guilty of causing her death.' 02 The court accepted that the patient was responsible for her own death, and that the defendant, who assisted her by supplying the means of death, was not responsible. However, the court did affirm the defendant's conviction for violating the controlled substances laws in supplying the drug, rejecting the defendant's defense of necessity.
A doctor's assistance in a patient's suicide can collide with the well-recognized duty of rescue imposed upon doctors by German law. In the 1984 Wittig case, the German Supreme Court held that a doctor who does not try to forestall the consequences of an attempted suicide may be criminally liable. 103 In the 1988 Hackethal case, however, the Supreme Court suggested that the doctor may be freed from the obligation to rescue if the patient experienced his life as torture and wanted to escape it;10 and in the 2001 case noted above, the court held that the duty of rescue did not apply since the patient, upon taking the drug, became rapidly unconscious and beyond help.
The right of self-determination recognized in these cases does not end when the patient becomes incompetent. In its judgment of September 13, 1994, the German Supreme Court explicitly recognized the right of an incompetent patient's representative to refuse treatment. In that case, the son and the physician of a 70-year-old patient with irreversible brain damage had requested the nursing staff of an institution to discontinue nutrition and hydration.' 05 The nursing staff refused and notified the guardian court, which in turn informed the prosecutor, resulting in the physician's and the son's prosecution for attempted manslaughter. The Supreme Court reversed a guilty verdict, recognizing that the patient's right to self-determination encompasses a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, and that this right could be exercised on behalf of incompetents where sufficient evidence exists, based on the patient's written or oral statements, religious views, and values, that the person would have declined treatment.
German law presently provides several avenues for decision-making for incompetents.'" The first possibility is the living will (Patientverflgungen).0 7 Patients may, while competent, expressly spell out what they want done in the event of future incapacity. Living wills do not seem to have the force that they have in the United States, but are rather a datum to consider in making end-of-life determinations. In practice, however, if a recent living will is available that addresses the situation at hand, it will probably be followed. Second, patients may grant another person a power of attorney to make medical decisions (Vorsorgevollmachten) in the future event of incapacity; this must be done expressly in writing while competent.' 0° Third, a patient may nominate a guardian (Betreuer) for the guardianship court to appoint in the event of incapacity. Under the guardianship law, the guardianship court must approve any medical decisions made by a guardian or power of attorney that threaten death or will have long-lasting effects on health.' 0 ' In its widely reported decision of July 20, 1998, the State Supreme Court of Frankfurt am Main held that the daughter and guardian of an 85-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative (but not terminal) condition could have artificial nutrition and hydration withdrawn (in accordance with the earlier expressed wishes of the mother), but that the approval of the guardianship court needed to be obtained. It is arguable, however, that guardian court approval is not necessary if the patient is in the process of dying. 110
Where no living will, person holding a power of attorney, or guardian exists, the attending physician must attempt to determine what the incompetent patient would have wanted done in the situation (mutmafllichen Willen). This should be discerned considering the patient's earlier statements, religious convictions, and attitude toward pain, as well as from the seriousness of the patient's current condition."' If it is impossible to sort out the patient's presumed will, the doctor should decide in the patient's best interests.
Though German law places a heavy emphasis on the patient's right of self-determination, it also emphasizes the obligations of physicians to dying patients. In particular, the doctor has an obligation to protect the patient from pain. In several cases, health care professionals have been found liable in civil and criminal law for causing unnecessary pain to patients by failing to provide adequate pain therapy.1 2 Moreover, the doctor who does attempt to protect a patient from pain can expect the protection of the law. In a 1996 case, the German Supreme Court held that a doctor who provided a dying patient with medically indicated pain medication in accordance with the expressed or presumed wishes of the patient, perhaps hastening the patient's death as a resuit, did not break the law." 3 This process is referred to in the German literature as Indirekt Sterbehilfe.
Nevertheless, some critics have charged that German doctors are reluctant to provide adequate pain therapy. A recent article by Klaus Kutzer, a justice of the German Supreme Court, quotes Professor Dr. Zens as stating that prescribing opiates in Germany for pain treatment lags 10 years behind other European countries."' Dr. Kutzer suggested that this might in part be due to restrictive interpretations of the German controlled substances regulations. Despite a commitment to palliative care as an alternative to euthanasia, palliative care still seems underdeveloped in Germany."'
JAPAN
The law respecting end-of-life decisions seems somewhat less developed in Japan than in the other countries in our study." 6 No statutory scheme has emerged for dealing with end-of-life decisions, and only a handful of judicial precedents give guidance. There is also little legal authority on pain management.
Patient autonomy is not as firmly established in Japan as in other countries. The principle of patient decision-making is certainly recognized. Indeed, a recent Japanese Supreme Court decision unanimously concluded that doctors who transfused a Jehovah's Witness against her express instructions had infringed her personal rights, and awarded damages for emotional distress.11 7 Nevertheless, Japanese doctors are reluctant to disclose much information to their patients, and generally expect patients to follow their directions.)' In particular, doctors are reluctant to disclose (and patients perhaps reluctant to receive) terminal diagnoses (especially a diagnosis of cancer), apparently believing that the patient will give up trying to survive in the face of such a diagnosis. Japanese doctors are more likely to disclose the diagnosis to the family, and work with the family to deceive the patient.' " Article 202 of the Japanese Criminal Code prohibits assistance in suicide or killing another on request. Physicians rely on this statute in refusing requests to terminate end-of-life treatment. On the other hand, once doctors decide that further treatment is not indicated, they can rely on Article 35 of the Criminal Code, which offers a defense of justification for acts done "in the course of legitimate business."' 20 Two reported court decisions involving euthanasia are the primary sources of end-of-life decision-making law in Japan. The first was the 1962 Nagoya High Court decision,"' in which a son was charged with "ascendant homicide" (the aggravated crime of killing one's ancestor) for poisoning his terminally ill father, who was suffering great pain, allegedly at the father's request.
The court countenanced the possibility that euthanasia could be legally permissible, but identified six conditions that had to be present: (1) the patient must be suffering from an incurable and imminently terminal condition; (2) the patient must be suffering unbearable and unrelievable pain; (3) the patient must be killed with the intention of alleviating the pain; (4) the act should be done only at the patient's explicit request; (5) the euthanasia should normally be carried out by a physician; and (6) the euthanasia must be carried out through ethically acceptable means.
The court held that the final two conditions had not been met in the particular case, and thus convicted the son, though he was sentenced to only four years in prison, with three suspended, for what was a potentially capital crime. In four subsequent cases of euthanasia by relatives, various courts found one or more criteria to be lacking and thus found the defendants guilty, but in each case the defendant was given a relatively light sentence.,2
The other reported case involving euthanasia, a 1995 case from the Yokohama District Court, involved the criminal prosecution of a doctor who had, in response to a patient's family's insistent and incessant requests, first terminated nutrition and hydration, then injected the patient with high doses of analgesics, and finally injected the patient with verapamil hydrochloride and potassium chloride, causing the patient's death. '2 The court convicted the doctor of murder, but sentenced him to only two years in prison.
The court held that treatment,of patients can be terminated if death is unavoidable and the patient is in the final stages of an incurable disease. The court suggested that more than one doctor should make the judgment of the impossibility of recovery and the patient should make an informed expression of his or her wish that treatment cease. If the patient is unable to consent, the family should be given accurate information about the patient's condition and then be allowed to state the patient's "inferred intent," based on its knowledge of the patient's character and values. The court expressed its hope that patients would have living wills in the future, but also stated that if a living will was vague or remote. in time it might not be of much use. The court concluded that life support measures (including artificial nutrition and hydration) could be terminated as well as other treatment measures, but the decision regarding the timing and termination of treatment was a medical judgment, presumably primarily for doctors to make.
With respect to euthanasia, the court distinguished between passive euthanasia (the cessation of life-sustaining treatment), indirect euthanasia (terminal sedation), and active euthanasia. The court stated that euthanasia is only appropriate if: (1) the physical pain is difficult to bear (mental suffering does not suffice); (2) the time of unavoidable death is near; (3) methods of eliminating the pain are exhausted; and (4) there is a dear expression of intent to accept death. Active euthanasia is permissible only if death is imminent, but indirect euthanasia can be used to hasten death. Active euthanasia is also only permissible if there is a clear expression of the patient's intent -substituted judgment does not suffice. Passive euthanasia, on the other hand, can be based on medical judgment as to futility and on the family's statement of intent, based on the patient's inferred intent, as noted above.
In the particular.case (where the doctor had injected the patient with verapamil hydrochloride and potassium chloride at the family's request), the court held that-active euthanasia was inappropriate because there was no informed consent on the part of the patient (who had not been told he was dying of cancer), the patient was unconscious and therefore not experiencing pain, and the family had not been told that the patient was not in pain. The court also faulted the doctor for relying on the family's judgment, as he had only known them a short time, and for buckling under the son's insistence on euthanasia, given the doctor's "higher status and position."
The law that emerges from these cases contrasts with the law of the United States and other common law countries in that it is more open to active euthanasia, but more reticent to accept withdrawal of treatment (which is effectively treated as a form of euthanasia). The two court decisions, for example, did not seem to countenance withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for a nonterminal patient in a persistent vegetative state. Advance directives have no particular legal status in Japan, though several organizations offer advance directive forms and encourage their use. 124 Japan has a very strict narcotic law, and medical use of narcotics is much more limited than in other countries.' 25 One expert states: "Such a rigid and complicated system of justifying the use of narcotics has forced many cancer patients with treatable pain to suffer compared with other advanced countries."
126 Physicians seem to fear that use of narcotics to control pain might lead to addiction or shorten the patient's life.
THENrnmuANm
The Netherlands was until recently the ofily nation in the world to have legalized active euthanasia (it was joined in 2002 by Belgium). In fact, the Dutch Criminal Code, like the German and Japanese codes, prohibits taking the life of another person "at the other person's express and earnest request," and also prohibits murder, manslaughter, and assisted suicide. 127 Since the mid-1900s, however, Dutch prosecutors have refrained from prosecuting doctors who committed euthanasia when the doctors conformed with certain substantive and procedural requirements established by the Supreme Court. 128 The court based these requirements on its interpretation of Article 40 of the Criminal Code, which provides: "A person who commits an offense as a result of a force that he could not be expected to resist
[overmacht] is not criminally liable."
12 ' In the 1984 Schoonheim case, a general practitioner was prosecuted for killing a 93-year-old woman who was-near the end of her life and suffering terribly, and had urgently requested euthanasia. The court accepted the argument that the killing was justified because the doctor had resolved in a responsible way the conflict between the professional duty to preserve life and the duty to spare a patient from suffering, and thus met the defense of necessity recognized by Article 40. 130 In April of 2001, the Dutch Parliament, after two decades of debate, adopted the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, which also amended the Criminal Code and the Burial and Cremation Act. This statute, which came into effect in 2002, legalizes the practice of euthanasia and of assistance in suicide by physicians where specific substantive and procedural requirements are met.
13 ' The Act amends Articles 293 and 294 of the Criminal Code, which prohibit killing on request and assistance in suicide, to provide that those acts are not illegal "if committed by a physician who fulfills the due care criteria" of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act, "and if the physician notifies the municipal pathologist" in accordance with S 7(2) of the Burial and Cremation Act.1 32
The "due care" criteria of S 2 of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act require that: a. the physician holds the conviction that the request by the patient was voluntary and well-considered; b. the physician holds the conviction that the patient's suffering was lasting and unbearable;
c. the physician has informed the patient about the situation he was in and about his prospects; d. and the patient holds the conviction that there was no other reasonable solution for the situation he was in; e. has consulted at least one other, independent physician who has seen the patient and has given his written opinion on the requirements of due care, referred to in parts a-d; and f. has terminated a life or assisted in a suicide with due care.
The Act further requires that a doctor who performs active euthanasia or assists with suicide under the statute must notify the local coroner of the death, providing the coroner with a detailed report on compliance with the due care requirements., 33 The coroner must in turn notify a regional review committee established under the Act for reviewing euthanasia cases.' 3 3 The coroner may also notify the prosecutor, who may in turn inform the coroner and regional review committee if he objects to the burial or cremation of the patient.
1 35 The regional review committee (which must include at least one legally trained member (the chair), one physician, and one ethicist) reviews the report, and decides whether the doctor has complied with the due care criteria.' 36 The committee may inform the prosecutor or the regional health care inspector if it concludes that the statutory procedure has not been complied with. ' 37 Doctors have long been expected to report cases of active euthanasia or assisted suicide to the local coroner.'13 Reporting has lagged well behind practice, in part because of the reluctance of doctors to report their conduct to local prosecutors.' 39 Under the new procedure, the government hopes that reporting will become more accepted, as the committees will have the power to shield reporting physicians from the threat of prosecution.' 40 The recent legislation also clears up two matters that had not been resolved in earlier court decisions. The first of these is how the euthanasia law operates with respect to children. Under the statute, a physician may terminate the life of a child aged 16 to 18, or assist with his or her suicide at the child's request, after consulting the child's parents.' 4 ' If the child is between 12 and 16, the attending physician may only honor a request for euthanasia or assistance in suicide if the child's parent or guardian agrees. 42 The second issue is that of persons who are incompetent, but who had prior to becoming incompetent executed an advance directive requesting that their lives be terminated upon reaching some future state of deterioration.'14 The physician may honor this request if otherwise in compliance with the due care criteria.
The statute does not require that the patient be in a terminal condition. It does not even require that the suffering be physical. In the Chabot case in 1994, the Supreme Court recognized that the patient's "unbearable and hopeless suffering" could be mental rather than physical, though it upheld the conviction of the psychiatrist in the particular case for violating other requirements in euthanizing an inconsolably grieving woman at her request.144 Every year a handful of psychiatric patients (2-5) are euthanized or assisted in suicide.
The statute does not address several important issues, some of which are otherwise resolved by court decisions, others of which remain unresolved. First, it does not address the practices of withdrawal of medical treatment or of terminal sedation. These practices are generally accepted in the Netherlands, and are specifically not considered to be euthanasia.'41 Dutch law, of course, permits competent patients to request that life-sustaining treatments (including artificial nutrition and hydration) be withdrawn or withheld.'14 Written advance directives, executed by a patient while competent and refusing treatment under specified circumstances, are also recognized under Article 450(3) of the Medical Contracts Act, though the statute also permits doctors to override the refusal if there are "well founded reasons for doing so."1 4 7
Physicians may also withdraw or withhold treatment that they regard as "futile."' 4 8 And doctors are permitted to administer drugs as necessary to relieve pain, even though the pain medication may hasten death.' 49 These practices are regarded as "normal" medical practice, and deaths resulting from them are regarded as natural deaths. They account for far more deaths than euthanasia or assisted suicide, 38.5 percent versus 2.7 percent, according to a 1995 study. ' 5 0 Finally, the statute does not address the situation of patients in a persistent vegetative state (except if they have already executed an advance directive). A recent case found a general practitioner guilty of murder for killing an 84-year-old dying patient who was in a coma, but the court imposed only a suspended fine as a sanction."'I Because the patient was incapable of voluntarily requesting euthanasia, the case was not covered by the statute. Surveys, however, show that killing patients in the absence of a voluntary request is not uncommon (perhaps about 1,000 cases a year), and might in some cases be found to be justified under the defense of necessity where sustaining life could be regarded as inhumane.,1 2 The practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands has been widely condemned by external commentators, and is not universally accepted within the Netherlands."' The new Conservative government elected this past summer has pledged to review the practice of euthanasia. A significant majority of the Dutch population, however, seems to have accepted the current practice of euthanasia. Dutch commentators also often claim that other countries permit very similar medical practices, but simply do not admit to doing so. Without joining this debate, we must observe that the Netherlands firmly holds down the most extreme position in its end-of-life law of any country in our survey.
CONCLUSION
Each of the countries surveyed here addresses end of life and pain management from its own unique legal perspective. There seems to be consensus on a few issues (the right of competent persons to refuse treatment), near-consensus on more issues (the impermissibility of active euthanasia), yet more diversity on others (the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment). Most countries recognize the use of large doses of narcotics at the end of life to ease pain, yet in a number of countries experts believe that pain remains undertreated. While the common law countries on the whole take similar approaches, the civil law countries are more varied in their responses. Learning from the perspectives of other countries might help us to understand our own law better, and perhaps to improve it. 43. S 4 of RTIA provided that "a patient who, in the course of a terminal illness, is experiencing pain, suffering and/or distress to an extent unacceptable to the patient" could request "the patient's medical practitioner to assist the patient to terminate the patient's life." Part 1, § 3, defined the medical practitioner's assistance "in relation to death or proposed death of a patient" as involving "the prescribing of a substance, the preparation of a substance and the giving of a substance to the patient for self administration, and the administration of the substance to the patient." By virtue of Part 4, § 18(2), this kind of "assistance" was to be "taken to be medical treatment for the purposes of the law."
44. The Euthanasia Laws Act (1997) (Cth), Schedule (1). Additionally, the Commonwealth Parliament disempowered the Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory from enacting "laws which permit or have the effect of permitting (whether subject to conditions or not) the form of intentional killing of another called euthanasia (which includes mercy killing) or the assisting of a person to terminate his or her life. 47. Latimer pleaded that the conviction should not stand because the trial judge erred in removing the defense of necessity from the jury. The necessity consisted of the pain his daughter was thought to experience during seizures, which she suffered daily, and additional pain that was due to weight loss caused by a lack of nutrients in her spoon-feeding regimen. The final aspect of "necessity" was the recommendation of hospital doctors that in order to relieve pain caused by a dislocated hip, Tracy should undergo surgery to remove her upper thigh bone. Latimer perceived this procedure as mutilation, and "forrAed the view that his daughter's life was not worth living." R. 48. Id. at 12. The Supreme Court rejected all three arguments, and determined that the defense of necessity was misconceived. Latimer himself did not face any peril, and Tracy's ongoing pain did not constitute an emergency. The court emphasized that though severely disabled, Tracy was not terminally ill. She "enjoyed music, bonfires, being with her family and the circus. She liked to play music on a radio, which she could use with a special button. Tracy could apparently recognize family members and she would express joy at seeing them. 61. The provision entrenches the autonomy of medical practitioners' decisions regarding treatment options. It also imposes on medical practitioners an obligation to inform patients of alternative medical treatments. However, the parenthetical clause, which is an exception relating to the necessity for prompt medical intervention, makes it unclear whether medical discretion extends to instances of withholding or withdrawal of life-saving
